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WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
A SYSTEM IN NEED
Harry E. Kinzie III*
Thomas D. Nyhan * *
'Since the 1975 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act,
Illinois employers have been plagued by rising compensation costs.
Mr. Kinzie and Mr. Nyhan review the original purpose behind
workers' compensation and then demonstrate Illinois' significant
departure from this theoretical goal. In particular, they criticize
Illinois' trend toward indemnity payments for injured employees
and the ever expanding basis of employer liability under Illinois
Supreme Court and Industrial Commission decisions. Finally, the
authors argue for the redirection of Illinois' compensation system to
better accomplish its legitimate purpbse-monetary relief for em-
ployees' work-related injuries that reduce earning capacity.
What is today known as workers' compensation' in Illinois began in
Europe in the 1880's and 1890's during the industrial revolution. Termed
"social legislation," workers' compensation was initially based on the need to
compensate individuals who could not recover at common law for their
industrial injuries. 2  Such legislation attempted to make employees partially
whole for wage loss due to occupational injuries while shifting the cost of
work place accidents to employers as an integral part of the cost of produc-
tion.3 From its inception to the present, workers' compensation has under-
gone dramatic change in Illinois.
• Associate, Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Lawrence Univer-
sity; J.D., Loyola University.
•* Senior Partner, Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago,Illinois; B.S.C., Loyola Uni-
versity; J.D., Loyola University.
1. The title of the Illinois compensation act was amended in 1977, effective January 1,
1980, changing the title from the "Workmen's Compensation Act" to the "Workers' Compensa-
tion Act." Similarly, all references to "workmen" were revised to "workers." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 138.1 (1979).
2. The general history and background of workers' compensation are discussed in 1 T.
ANCERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1-9 (rev. ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
ANGERSTEIN]; 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1-5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON 1; 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1-10 (3d ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited
as SCHNEIDER].
3. In the words of Professor Larson:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom
of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial
and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlight-
ened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory
form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source
of payment, the consumer of the product.
1 LARSON, suipra note 2, § 2.20.
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Change did not occur overnight or even within the last few years. The
original Illinois statute compensated primarily on the basis of actual wages
lost. 4 Within a scant six years, however, the legislature provided for an
alternative recovery based upon presumed wage loss by successively enacting
compensation schedules first for amputations, 5 next for total loss of use, 6
and, finally, for permanent partial loss of use. 7 The administration of the
system, which came to focus largely upon permanent partial disability assess-
ment, effected other alterations by adjusting disability awards upward for
what was perceived to be a basic inadequacy in the statutory rates of com-
pensation. Simultaneously, the Illinois courts acquiesced in an expanded
basis of recovery by affirming the Industrial Commission's decisions that
permitted recovery for almost any injury that could in any way be related to
the employment.
Prior to the substantial changes made by the Illinois General Assembly in
1975,8 compensation costs to Illinois employers were large but were not
dramatic. After the legislature's 1975 enactments that substantially increased
compensation rates, the impact of the previously expanded basis for workers'
compensation became all too clear. The dramatic effect of the new statutory
rates applied on the existing system is demonstrated by reported cost in-
creases of up to 1000% to 1500% in some industries." Unquestionably, these
changes have had a significant adverse impact on the Illinois business cli-
mate. Faced with such prohibitive expenses, many businesses have begun to
locate or expand in other jurisdictions.' 0
This problem is not as parochial as was once thought. Manufacturers in
Illinois are facing increasing competitive pressures from abroad; today, com-
parisons of the sunbelt versus the snowbelt are not sufficient. Although the
cost of workers' compensation is certainly not the sole explanation, it has
clearly become significant enough to merit serious attention.
The need for change is manifest. Accordingly, this Article examines the
shift from the original policy of compensating employees for actual wage loss
4. See Act of June 10, 1911, § 4(a), 1911 111. Laws 317 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138 (1979)).
5. See Act of June 28, 1913, § 8(e), 1913 I11. Laws 342 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138.8(e) (1979)).
6. id.
7. See Act of May 31, 1917, § 8(e)(17), 1917 I11. Laws 490 (current version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)(16) (1979)).
8. See Act of June 30, 1975, Pub. Act No. 79-79, §§ 7-8, 1975 I11. Laws 224 (current version
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.7-.8 (1979)). See generally Parrish, Workmen's Compensation
Law in Illinois: Some Economic Consequences of Recent Changes, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 715,
719-22 (1978).
9. Hearings of the Joint Legislative Committee on Workers' Compensation Costs of the
Illinois General Assembty, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. (1979) (statement of William Shaw,
Illinois' Manufacturer's Association).
10. See Parrish, Workmen's Compensation Law in Illinois: Some Economic Consequences of
Recent Changes, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 715, 723 (1978).
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to the prevailing modern practice of employee indemnity regardless of loss in
earning capacity. The Article also examines the concomitant trend expand-
ing the underlying bases of employer liability. Such developments have
created a system that today approaches the point of rendering employers the
guarantors of their employees' health, a clearly improper result in light of the
system's avowed purpose.
HISTORICAL BAsIs AND IMPETUS
In the late 19th century, the complexities of the industrial revolution gave
birth to a need for a new system to compensate employees who experienced a
loss of or a diminution in earning capacity as a result of injuries suistained
while performing tasks reasonably required to fulfill the duties of their
occupations. Before compensation acts, workers who suffered bodily injury
while engaged in their employment could take legal action against their
employers only by suits at common law.'" To recover, they had to show that
their injuries arose from their employer's personal negligence.' 2 In addition,
the employee had to contend with other common law doctrines that imposed
virtually insurmountable obstacles to recovery in most cases.' 3 The common
law deprived an employee of any personal injury recovery if he or she had
assumed the risk of injury 14 or if the injury was due in whole or in part to his
or her own contributory negligence.' 5 The fellow servant doctrine, which
freed the employer from liability for an employee's injury caused by a
negligent fellow worker, proved an even more difficult hurdle in most
cases.' 0 Although in these cases the employee retained a common law action
against a negligent fellow worker, such rights were practically worthless
because most "fellow" workers lacked sufficient assets to warrant the litiga-
tion.
11. See, e.g., Pioneer Fireproof Constr. Co. v. Howell, 189 I11. 123, 59 N.E. 535 (1901)
(negligence action against employer by employee struck by rivet; employer had duty to use
reasonable care to keep workplace in a reasonably safe condition). See generally 1 ANGERSTEIN,
supra note 2, § 2.
12. The employer, for example, could be found negligent for failing to provide a reasonably
safe working environment, for failing to warn of known hazards, for failing to provide safe tools,
or for failing to hire competent co-workers. 1 ANGERSTEIN, supra note 2, §2. See also P. COHEN,
THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 196 (1932).
13. Statistics indicate that perhaps 50% of all industrial injuries at that time were unavoid-
able occurrences, with no negligent antecedents. Workers, of course, could not recover in such
cases. In fact, less than 15% of injured workers recovered damages through common law tort
liability. See 1 ANCERSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 2-3. See also Eason, Workmen's Compensation:
1974 What the Future Holds, 10 FORUM 145, 146-47 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Chicago & E. 11. R.R. v. Heerey, 203 I11. 492, 68 N.E. 74 (1903) (employee
cannot recover for injury resulting from incidental risks of employment of which he or she should
have known).
15. See, e.g., King v. Illinois Midland Coal Co., 158 I11. App. 351 (3d Dist. 1910) (slight lack
of due care by employee sufficient to defeat recovery).
16. See, e.g., Gartland v. Toledo, Wabash & W. Ry., 67 Ill. 498 (1873) (minor denied
recovery when injury caused by co-worker in same line of duty).
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Because of the restrictions on recovery, uncompensated employees ren-
dered incapable of supporting themselves and their families after industrial
accidents sustained through their own fault, the fault of their fellow
workers, or no one's fault at all far outnumbered those able to recover
damages. Hardship forced these employees to turn to the charitable resources
of the community for survival, and the resulting burdens placed on society
were decried as intolerable as a matter of public policy.' 7 Consequently, in
industrial injury cases, the practice of assessing monetary damages based
upon fault was deemed inadequate to meet the problems of a burgeoning
industrial economic society.'
To correct this deficiency, a concept of no-fault recovery emerged in
Europe during the 1880's and 1890's. 19 Underlying this theory was the
philosophy that employees needed protection from wage interruption or loss
resulting from employment-related injuries, and that the particular industry
being served should bear the costs of that protection. 20  Thus, early workers'
compensation statutes were based upon a simple premise: irrespective of
fault, each industry should shoulder the responsibility for their industrially
injured employees who incurred loss of earning capacity, a loss previously
borne by employees. The quid pro quo for this unprecedented expansion of
liability was the elimination of employer liability at common law.
This concept of no-fault recovery spread to the United States in the early
1900's.2I The development of workers' compensation laws, however, pro-
gressed slowly. As each state dealt with the issue, 2 it faced the arguments
that workers' compensation ran afoul of the provisions of the Federal and
17. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917). The New York
Central court noted that the common law doctrines were merely fictions that were inadequate to
apply to modern employment conditions, that the expense and delay of a common law action
frequently defeated justice, that the burden of injury is almost entirely sustained by the em-
ployees who are often forced to depend upon charity, and that prolonged litigation often results
in antagonism between employer and employee. Id. at 197. See also D. GACLIARDO, AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 390 (1949).
18. NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 33-34 (1972).
19. See D. CAGLIARDO, AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 390 (1949).
20. See McCloskey, The Changing Face of Illinois Workmen's Compensation: In Search of a
Workable Response to Federal Guidelines, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 543, 544 (1977).
21. The year 1911 marked the true beginning of worker's compensation laws in the United
States. In that year, California, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin, all enacted workers' compensation legislation. This
activity came after a false start when Maryland's 1902 statute was held unconstitutional in
Franklin v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 2 Baltimore City Rep. 309 (C.P. Baltimore 1904), cited in
1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 5.20 n.40. By 1921 all but a few states had enacted workers'
compensation legislation. See generally Grillo, Fifty Years of Workmen's Compensation-An
Historical Review, 38 CONN. B.J. 239 (1964); Larson, Th6 Nature and Origins of Workmen's
Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952).
22. The states were left to resolve workers' compensation problems by virtue of the tenth
amendment's reserved powers clause. See C. HOBBS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE 81,
83 (2d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as HOBBS].
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state Constitutions by denying employees the right to sue at common law. 23
There was also much concern about the effects of such a no-fault statute on
employer liability. 24  After considerable deliberation, however, various
states began to adopt compensation acts based upon the European precedent
that, without regard to fault, employers pay compensation to those injured
while performing the tasks required by their employment. 25 Significant in
this early legislation was the limitation that only those injuries arising out of
and in the course of the employment be compensated. 2  Perhaps even more
significant, however, was the provision that the benefits to be paid for
compensable injuries would be based only on actual wage loss suffered by an
employee as a consequence of the injury. 27
Under the no-fault concept of employer liability, the array of common law
damages are unavailable. 8  In return, however, the injured worker need
only prove that he or she sustained disabling injuries as a result of risks
reasonably assumed in order to perform the duties of the employment.29  Not
only were employees no longer required to prove employer fault, but the
employer was also stripped of the common law defenses previously available
and which, in most cases, had barred the employee's recovery. Thus, the
defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow servant doctrine, and as-
sumption of risk were no longer applicable. 30
While the avowed purpose of workers' compensation has not changed
from its inception, the Illinois system today bears little resemblance to its
initial expression. Not only have legislative changes and administrative poli-
cies altered the system's compensation payment scheme, but Illinois Supreme
Court decisions and administrators' awards have dramatically changed the
purview and effect of workers' compensation. Unfortunately, they have done
so by unreasonably expanding both the basis for compensability and the
assessment of disability.
23. See, e.g., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911) (New York's
statute held to violate due process clause). The amended version of the New York legislation was
held constitutional in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
24. See HOBBS, supra note 22, at 83.
25. See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 5.10, .20.
26. Id. § 6.10.
27. See generally New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 193 (1917). The New York
Central court, in describing the New York statute, stated that "[c]ompensation under the act is
not regulated by the measure of damages applied in negligence suits, but in addition to providing
medical, surgical, or other like treatment, it is based solely on loss of earning power, being
graduated according to the average weekly wages of the employee and the character and
duration of the disability. ... Id.
28. 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 2.40.
29. See, e.g., Act of June 10, 1911, § 1, 1911 Ill. Laws 315 (current version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1(b)(2) (1979)). See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 2.40.
30. See, e.g., Act of June 10, 1911, § 1, 1911 111. Laws 315 (employers could not rely on
doctrines of fellow servant, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence) (current version at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 (1979)). See also Krause, Statutory Torts in Illinois, 1967 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 3.
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FROM WAGE Loss To SCHEDULED BENEFITS
With the exception of New Jersey,"' the first compensation acts in the
United States were pure wage loss statutes providing for payment of disabil-
ity benefits on the basis of lost weekly wages.32 These first laws did not
include compensation schedules as we know them today. Schedules soon
began to appear, but only for those losses resulting in amputation of specific
members of the body. These early schedules in effect established an irrebut-
able presumption that an amputation would result in a specific wage loss,
thereby relieving employees of the burden of proving actual wage loss. 33
Professor Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania opined:
The determining consideration [for presumed wage loss] was that,
by rendering the amount definite, litigation would be prevented
since whenever a mutilation of this sort occurred, there could be no
question as to the extent of disability. It was to prevent all litigation
over the extent of disability that the schedule was adopted.3 4
Ironically, those limited loss schedules, adopted to reduce litigation, were
expanded so as to become a most fertile source of worker's compensation
litigation. It was but a short, simple legislative step from a limited presump-
tion of a specific wage loss for major member amputations to a statutory
presumption of wage loss when the loss of use of a retained body member
was total.35 Four years later in Illinois, the presumption of wage loss was
further expanded to include injuries resulting in a permanent partial loss of
use. 36 The law did not require the employee to prove an actual loss of
wages; it merely required proof of actual loss of use, to which would then
attach a presumed loss of earning capacity. 7 As early as 1921, the Illinois
31. See Act of June 10, 1911, § 11(c), 1911 N.J. Laws 137 (New Jersey statute based
compensation for permanent partial disability on 66 2/3% of daily wages and extent of perma-
nent partial disability) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 34, § 15-12 (West 1959 & Supp.
1981)).
32. See, e.g., Act of June 10, 1911, § 1, 1911 Ill. Laws 315 (current version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-28 (1979)). See generally R. MEEKER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
48 (1914); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 7 n.13.
33. See, e.g., Ch. 226, § 27, 1917 Kan. Sess. Laws 1923 (specific presumed wage losses in
weeks were attached to the total or partial amputation of a member) (current version at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1980)).
34. Address by Francis H. Bohlen, Pennsylvania Bar Association (1912) quoted in Address by
Dr. Arthur Larson, Annual Meeting of the Illinois Self-Insurance Association (Sept. 30, 1980).
35. See, e.g., Act of June 28, 1913, § 8 (e), 1913 Ill. Laws 335 ("[flor the loss of a hand, or
the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty per centum of the average weekly wage during
one hundred and fifty weeks") (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b)(9) (1979)).
See also Ballou v. Industrial Comm'n, 296 Ill. 434, 129 N.E. 755 (1921) (there can be loss of use
without actual severance of hands).
36. Act of May 31, 1917, § 8(e)(17), 1917 Ill. Laws 490 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138.8(e)(16) (1979)).
37. See, e.g., Cameron Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 326 Ill. 646, 158 N.E. 399 (1927)
(injury must be shown to be reasonably certain to result in permanent partial incapacity in
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Supreme Court began to affirm Industrial Commission awards for perma-
nent partial disability.3 8
The expansion of the system to include scheduled losses for partial loss of
use of body members not only defeated the schedule's stated purpose, that of
limiting litigation, but, in fact, spawned what many perceive as a veritable
litigation crisis. 39  It has been estimated, for instance, that in excess of 60 %
of the litigation in workers' compensation involves the parties' attempt to
resolve the question of the extent of partial loss of use.
40
Today, the Act continues to permit compensation in cases of reduced
earning capacity, but the practice of awarding recovery on the basis of
actual or prospective wage loss in partial permanent disability cases has been
virtually replaced in many states, including Illinois, by what amounts to an
indemnity payment based on the employee's weekly earnings at the time of
the injury. Some states, however, have persisted in the wage loss concept, 4'
and others have, 42 or are considering, 43 returning to the wage loss concept.
Recent amendments to the Illinois Act demonstrate the continued commit-
ment to compensate on a basis other than actual or prospective wage loss.
44
pursuing claimant's usual and customary line of employment); Swift & Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 302 Ill. 38, 134 N.E. 9 (1922) (claimant failed to prove permanent partial loss of use).
See also Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 404 Ill. 557, 90 N.E.2d 220 (1950).
38. See Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 I11. 578, 129 N.E. 521 (1920)
(award based on 33 1/3% permanent partial disability; affirmed).
39. One reason for litigation has been the need for delineating the territory covered by the
phrase "loss of use" in specific fact situations. For example, the spinal cord may have been
injured to produce a paralysis of the limbs, the limbs themselves having escaped direct harm.
Should compensation be allowed for incapacity of the limbs or should the measure of compensa-
tion be the physical injury to the spinal column? It would seem proper to compensate for the
measure of the worker's incapacity and not merely for the visible physical damage. See, e.g.,
Northwestern Barb Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 I11. 371, 187 N.E. 468 (1933) (there is a
compensable "loss" of member if normal use has been entirely impaired; no need for actual
severance); In re Burns 218 Mass. 8, 105 N.E. 601 (1914) (compensation properly allowed for
permanent incapacity of both legs, paralyzed by injury to spinal cord, although no actual injury
to legs themselves).
40. See J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAF=rr & HEALTH 24 (1977).
41. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 418.361(1) (Supp. 1980) (compensation based on
80 % of difference between the worker's after tax average weekly wage before the injury, and his
or her after tax average weekly wage after the injury).
42. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3) (West 1966) (amended 1979) (providing compen-
sation payments based on a schedule of presumed wage loss in weeks) with FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.15(3)(b) (West 1981) (providing compensation payment based on 95% of the difference
between 85% of the employee's pre-injury average monthly wage and his post-injury monthly
earnings after reaching maximum medical improvement, but not exceeding 66 2/3% of the
employee's pre-injury average monthly wage).
43. See H.B. 2600, Or. Legis. Assembly, 1981 Reg. Sess.
44. Act of June 30, 1975, Pub. Act No. 79-79, § 8(d)(2), 1975 Ill. Laws 224 (codified at ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d)(2) (1979)), provides:
If as a result of the accident, the employee sustains ...other injuries which
injuries do not incapacitate him from pursuing the duties of his employment but
which would disable him from pursuing other suitable occupations ...or if such
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Prior to 1975, the Act provided for maximum awards when demonstrable
impairment resulted in cases of fracture(s) of the skull, vertebral bodies,
transverse processes, or facial bones; the removal of a kidney, spleen or
lung. 45 These scheduled injuries were added to the Act from time to time in
order to avoid adoption of a "man as a whole" provision in the Act. 46  The
compensation provided in the Act was the maximum amount for the sched-
uled injuries; however, in practice, administrators over the years had estab-
lished a policy of awarding these maximums irrespective of the existence or
extent of demonstrable impairment. This administrative policy became so
ingrained in the Illinois system that the entitlement to the maximum became
nearly automatic upon proof that the particular fracture or organ removal
had occurred. 47
Although the need for schedules for the above mentioned injuries ceased
with the advent of the "man as a whole" provisions in section 8(d)(2) of the
1975 legislation, 4 the General Assembly reinforced the indemnity concept
by changing what had formerly been maximum awards for other specified
impairments to minimum awards. 4  To be sure, the legislature should have
removed these scheduled injuries from the Act entirely rather than cloak
them with the statutory presumption of a resulting disablity. 50
Although the legislature established presumptions of disability in only a
limited number of areas, the Industrial Commission over the years estab-
lished and applied its own set of presumptions of disability on a broader scale
in spite of the frequent lack of credible evidence that any disability existed.
Over the years, for example, Commissions have presumed that a minimum
amount of disability would result from any fracture of an extremity. Awards
for loss of use in such cases were routinely rendered notwithstanding that
there was no evidence of disability. 5' This concept of presumed minimum
injuries partially incapacitate him . . . but do not result in an impairment of earning
capacity . . . he shall receive . . . compensation at the rate provided in . . . this
Section ....
Id.
45. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d) (1973) (amended 1975) (providing for
maximum awards and limitations on length of compensation period) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 138.8(d) (1979) (providing for minimum length of compensation period for various
disabilities, with no maximum amount provided).
46. "Man as a whole" provisions permit decisional bodies to weigh the loss of use of a specific
member against future employability of the entire person in rendering a compensation award.
Such awards are supported by estimates of the functional loss to the whole person of a given lost
body member. See 2 LARSON, supra note 2, § 58.11 app. B (Table 11).
47. See Stevenson, The Illinois Workmen's Compensation System: A Description and Cri-
tique, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 698 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson].
48. Act of June 30, 1975, Pub. Act No. 79-79, § 8(d)(2), 1975 Ill. Laws 224 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d)(2) (1979)).
49. Id. § 8(d).
50. In 1980, the General Assembly acted to reduce the minimum amounts payable for
particular injuries, but it left the presumption intact. See Act of September 15, 1980, Pub. Act
No. 81-1482, § 8, 1980 I11. Laws 1695 (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d) (1979)).
51. See Stevenson, supra note 47, at 698.
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disability was by no means limited to fractures. On the contrary, it was clear
to anyone who regularly practiced before the Commission that there were, in
fact, certain standard minimum amounts that the Commission would award
for specific types of injury.5 2 So ingrained had the practice become in our
system that frequent legislative demands-vigorously opposed by the plain-
tiff's bar and organized labor-were made for a published schedule of these
standards. 53 Because the schedule of presumed minimums was, in fact,
unpublished, another informal adjustment could occur in the system.
Former Commissions were able to adjust what were perceived to be inade-
quate maximum compensation rates. In years past, virtually all legislation in
this field, including revision of those maximum rates, was the product of the
Agreed Bill Process. Through that process, an agreement was reached be-
tween representatives of both labor and management as to what changes
would be made in any given legislative session. There were occasions, how-
ever, when agreement was not reached between the parties, and the law,
including the maximum compensation rate payable, was not changed. When
the Agreed Bill Process failed to achieve such changes, the Commissions
could, and often did, administratively adjust the perceived inadequate rate
for all but the most serious injuries by simply increasing the presumed
percentage of minimum disability applicable to a specific injury. Thus, for
example, minimum awards in cases of simple fractures escalated from a
range of 7 1/2% to 10%, to between 15% and 20% loss of use of the
particular member involved.5 4 This type of escalation was applied to all
injuries except, of course, those where the genuine disability was so high that
the award could not be escalated; an employee who had sustained a genuine
90% loss of use of a particular member clearly could not be awarded
compensation for anything more than 100% of that member.
Recent developments will serve to correct some of these historic problems.
In 1980, the Act was amended to require arbitrator's decisions handed down
on and after January 1, 1981, to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of
52. The present Commission's Chairperson has questioned this policy. See Dixon v. Calhoun
County Constr. Co., 79 W.C. 80,192 (Ill. Indus. Comm'n, Oct. 9, 1980) (Schneiderman,
Comm'r, dissenting) (criticizing Industrial Commission's practice of granting awards despite the
lack of proof of a permanent partial disability). See also Stevenson, supra note 47, at 699. "A set
of other 'standards' has grown in the Commission. For example, a fractured oscalcis is worth (at
least) thirty-five percent loss of use of the foot .... One learns these 'standards' only by being
associated with the Commission for they are not printed or published in any manner." Id.
53. S.B. 1739, 81st I11. Gen. Assembly (1980) (introduced March 27, 1980), represents the
latest proposal to codify such standards. This bill, which has failed passage on three separate
occasions, would require the Industrial Commission to establish standards for determining the
extent of the disability sustained in order to ensure uniform application of the Worker's Compen-
sation Act.54. These figures are approximations derived from the authors' practical experience before
the Illinois Industrial Commission. Industrial Commission decisions have been published since




law. 55 In addition, decisions of the Industrial Commission are to contain
findings of fact, conclusions of law and the Commission's reasoning in arriv-
ing at its opinion. The Commission's decisions are required to be regarded as
precedent by the arbitrators. 56 Thus, any previously unpublished standards
applied by the Commission should now manifest themselves in the develop-
ing body of new case law. Furthermore, Rebecca Schneiderman, the present
Chairman of the Industrial Commission, has taken issue with the policy of
automatic awards, 5 7 and from the Commission opinions published to date, it
appears clear that credible evidence of disability is now essential to support
an award. 5
But irrespective of these changes, it is apparent that the original theory of
workers' compensation based on wage loss is now virtually extinct in Illinois.
Today's awards for loss of use in most cases amount to indemnity payments
for injuries sustained which are totally unrelated to present or prospective
loss in earning capacity. That this concept has developed into one of the most
serious problems in Illinois is illustrated by the experience of one of the state's
largest employers, a self-insured corporation, which paid 58% of its 1978
compensation dollars and 72% of its 1979 compensation dollars for partial
permanent disability awards arid settlements alone . 5  The remaining 42%
of its 1978 compensation dollars and 28 % of its 1979 compensation dollars
went to pay all amounts for temporary total compensation benefits, wage
loss compensation benefits and death benefits. 0 Although there are no
accurate industry-wide statistics of this type available from the Industrial
Commission or the insurance industry, these figures track with information
received from other large self-insured employers in the state. 1
BASIS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Paralleling these legislative changes and the shifts in administrative atti-
tudes has been a tendency of both the Illinois Supreme Court and various
Commissions to expand the underlying basis of employer liability. Of course,
the statutory basis for employer liability has not changed since the enactment
of the first acts in the early 1900's. Employer liability was to be predicated on
55. Act of September 15, 1980, Pub. Act No. 81-1482, § 19, 1980 I11. Laws 1695 (amending
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(b) (1979)).
56. Act of September 15, 1980, Pub. Act No. 81-1482, § 19, 1980 I11. Laws 1695 (amending
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(e) (1979)).
57. See note 52 supra.
58. Illinois Industrial Commission, Dec. No. 81 IIC 1, 5 (1981)(factors to be considered in
determining nature and extent of disability).
59. See Illinois Workers' Compensation: The Caterpillar Perspective (June, 1980) (unpub-
lished white paper available from Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois).
60. Id. See also Hearings on Workers' Compensation Before the Revenue Committee of the
House of Representatives of the Illinois General Assembly, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1980 Sess.
(March 26, 1980) (statement of Timothy L. Elder, Caterpillar Tractor Co.).
61. Address by Thomas D. Nyhan, Machinery and Allied Products Institute Conference,
January 31, 1980, in Workers' Compensation: A System in Need of Reform, a transcript of MAPI
Conference, January 31 - February 1, 1980, Washington, D.C.
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the nature of the risk and the circumstances surrounding the occurrence.
Before an employer would be held liable under the Act, an accidental injury
had to arise out of, as well as in the course of, the employment.6 2 It should
be understood that the phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" are
used conjunctively. Both elements must be present in order to impose liabil-
ity under the Act.6 3 "Arising out of" was initially defined to require the risk
producing the injury to be one which the employee was reasonably required
to assume in performing his or her job.6 4 "In the course of" was defined to
require that the injury be one which occurred at a time, place, and under
circumstances reasonably required by the employment.6 5 Later, this restric-
tive construction was weakened to encompass numerous employee injuries.
THE EARLY INTEMPRETATIONS
As initially construed, these two elements served as constraints on em-
ployer liability and thereby prevented the employer from becoming an abso-
lute insurer of the employee's health and well-being. Indeed, the supreme
court once noted that "it was not the intention of the legislature to make the
employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an
employee. '6 6  The following synopsis of cases make the court's earlier ap-
proach quite clear.
In its 1917 decision in Dietzen v. Industrial Board, 7 the supreme court
barred recovery where an employee, whose duties involved polishing metal
plates, sustained injuries while voluntarily attempting to clean an exhaust
system. The injury was deemed uncompensable because it did not "arise out
of" his employment within the meaning of the Act. 8 Similarly, in Atlas
62. Compare Act of June 10, 1911, § 1, 1911 I11. Laws 315 (1911) (repealed 1913) (compen-
sation for injuries "sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment .. ") with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.2 (1979) (stating the same).
63. See, e.g., United Disposal & Recovery Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 480, 485-86,
126 N.E. 183, 186 (1920) (compensation denied because injury did not "arise out of" employ-
ment). For an early discussion of the Act's "arising under" language, see T. ANGERSTEIN, THE
EMPLOYER AND THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr OF ILLINOIS §§ 84-123 (2d ed. 1930).
64. See, e.g., Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 346 Ill. 89, 93-95, 178 N.E. 357,
358-59 (1931) (automobile accident held to arise out of employment because it was a possible risk
to a travelling employee); Mueller Constr. Co. v. Industrial Bd., 283 Ill. 148, 152-59, 118 N.E.
1028, 1029-32 (1918) (injury while walking to use a public phone at a construction site held to
arise out of employment because it was an actual risk of employment).
65. See, e.g., Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill. 188, 190-91, 13 N.E.2d 164, 164-65
(1938) (injury suffered in performance of duties on streets and highways held to be in course of
employment).
66. Mueller Constr. Co. v. Industrial Bd., 283 Ill. 148, 152, 118 N.E. 1028, 1030 (1918).
67. 279 Ill. 11, 116 N.E. 684 (1917).
68. Id. at 22, 116 N.E. at 688. Accord, Lutheran Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 342 Ill. 325,
331, 174 N.E. 381, 383 (1931) (when previous scope of duties were related to valves and pumps,
injuries resulting from voluntary work on boiler did not arise out of employment); George S.
Mepham & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 289 Ill. 484, 490, 124 N.E. 540, 542 (1919) (voluntary
services unrelated to employment held not to arise out of course of employment).
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Linen Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission,6 9 compensation was denied for
injuries resulting when an employee removed a portion of a structure that a
contractor had been hired to remove. Refusing to allow liability to follow a
benefit accruing to the employer, the court found that the "danger was not
one which arose out of [this employee's] work." 70 Nine years later in North-
western Yeast Co. v. Industrial Commission, 7' a similar result followed
when an employee opened and fell through a window in an area of the plant
where he had no duties. There, the court concluded that any danger attend-
ing such acts was "quite outside any risk of his employment." 72
The supreme court also denied recovery when risks were not peculiar to
the particular employee's employment but were incurred by the public at
large. Thus, an employee who slipped on ice while en route to work was
denied recovery, 73 and so were employees injured by a defective match used
to light a cigarette at work7 4 or injured when crossing railroad tracks after
leaving his place of employment. 75 Finally, compensation was denied when
an injury occurred while an employee was en route to a company picnic. 76
In the court's words, "[i]t would be extending the provisions of the Compen-
sation Act to undue lengths to hold that such an injury arose out of and in the
course of his employment." 77 In each of the above cases, the court looked to
the nature of the risk involved in the particular injury to determine whether
it was one peculiar to the employment-one which the employee reasonably
had to assume in order to perform his assigned duties.
As the case law demonstrates, early Illinois Supreme Court decisions con-
sistently interpreted the key statutory phrases "arising out of" and "in the
course of" employment narrowly. If an employee created an unnecessary risk
by performing gratuitous or unauthorized services, any injuries resulting
from that risk were deemed noncompensable. Along the same lines, recrea-
tional activities and risks not peculiar to the employment were also consid-
ered beyond the statute's coverage. Finally, the fact that any or all of the
above types of conduct happed to benefit the employer was not sufficient to
allow recovery under the Act.
69. 348 Ill. 69, 180 N.E. 570 (1932).
70. Id. at 75, 180 N.E. at 572.
71. 378 I11. 195, 37 N.E.2d 806 (1941).
72. Id. at 200, 37 N.E.2d at 809. Cf. Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 293 I11. 350,
127 N.E. 737 (1920) (employee allowed compensation when he fell from a window which
employees customarily used).
73. Farley v. Industrial Comm'n, 378 Ill. 234, 37 N.E.2d 787 (1941). Accord, Northwestern
Univ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 409 I11. 216, 99 N.E.2d 18 (1951).
74. Hill Luthy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E.2d 605 (1952).
75. Steel Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 388 Ill. 66, 57 N.E.2d 454 (1944).
76. Becker Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 333 I11. 340, 164 N.E. 668 (1929).
77. Id. at 344, 164 N.E. at 670.
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THE EXPANSIVE TREND
In recent years the Commission and the courts have broadened the defini-
tion of "arising out of and in the course of employment." This expansion has
not only extended the applicability of the Act well beyond the developed
parameters by rationalizations which strain basic principles of logic and
judicial consistency, but it has also made employers virtual insurers of their
employees' general health and welfare.
For example, in a 1955 landmark decision, Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 78 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed an award of compensa-
tion for injuries sustained by an employee in an after hours, company-spon-
sored baseball game. The record in that case demonstrated that the employer
had both sponsored and promoted the activity. The proof also established
that the employee's participation was voluntary; that he was neither hired to
play baseball nor given time away from his job to practice for or participate
in the games. Nevertheless, in finding that the injury arose out of the em-
ployment, the court apparently abandoned any inquiry into whether the risk
involved in the injury was one peculiar to the employment or one which the
employee was reasonably required to assume to perform his assigned duties.
Instead the court focused on whether the injury occurred during activities
that benefited the employer, and the court reasoned that the after hours,
company-sponsored game was a significant, if not tangible, benefit to the
employer. In support of its conclusion, the court stressed that the employer
financed the activity and exerted "subtle" pressures on the employee to
participate. Further, the court assumed that advertising benefits inured to
the employer, and found that the resulting good will and esprit de corps
among the employees benefited the employer."'
In 1958, the supreme court was confronted with another recreational
injury case involving slightly different facts in Hydro-Line Manufacturing
Co. v. Industrial Commission. ° A foreman of the employer had posted a
notice on the company bulletin board notifying anyone interested in partici-
pating in baseball games to sign an attached list. The president of the
employer offered no objection to the plan and, in fact, agreed to purchase
the equipment when the team was organized. The claimant, who had signed
his name on the list, sustained injuries the next day while playing baseball
78. 6 I11. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955). The Jewel Tea decision evoked considerable
commentary. See Note, Workmen's Compensation-Injury Occurring During Participation in
Intra-Company Softball League Game Held Compensable, 5 DEPAUL L. REV. 337 (1956); Note,
Workmen's Compensation-Injury Incurred in Company Sponsored Baseball Game Held Com-
pensable, 27 Miss. L.J. 158 (1956); Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Recrea-
tional Injuries, 23 U. Cni. L. REV. 328 (1956).
79. 6 Ill. 2d at 313-16, 128 N.E.2d at 704-05. In developing this "benefits" analysis, the
Jewel Tea court relied upon Minnesota, Le Bar v. Ewald Bros., 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729
(1944), and New York, Fagen v. Albany Evening Union Co., 261 A.D. 861, 24 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1941), precedent. The court, however, disregarded the seemingly compelling Illinois decison in
F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 333 I11. 340, 164 N.E. 668 (1929).
80. 15 I11. 2d 156, 154 N.E.2d 234 (1958).
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during the lunch hour on a lot adjacent to the plant. The evidence disclosed
that the bat and ball used at the time were owned by a fellow employee and
that the foreman was supervising the activity "in a form." 8' In reversing an
award for compensation, the court concluded that: "We find the facts of this
case totally insufficient to show any appreciable degree of employer control,
supervision, encouragement, or benefit. We, therefore, find as a matter of
law that the claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his
employment." 82
Several years later in Ace Pest Control, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 8
3
the court similarly abandoned any inquiry into whether the risk of injury
was one peculiar to the employment and applied a new and different test. In
this case, a man employed as an exterminator was required to travel to the
homes of various customers who requested termite control services. The
company supplied a truck bearing its name.
After completing one such assignment at approximately 5:00 p.m., the
employee began his return trip to his company's offices. On the way, he
came upon an immobilized vehicle, stopped to offer assistance, and found
that a woman with four young children had run out of gas. The employee
offered to acquire gasoline for the stranded motorist, but instead, at her
request agreed to take her and her four children home. Thereafter, the
employee drove the woman's husband to the immobilized vehicle. When the
employee stepped from his truck to assist in starting the stalled vehicle, he
was struck and killed by a passing automobile.8 4 Without even addressing the
question whether the risk of this injury was a part of, or incidental to the
duties of termite control, the court found employer liability under the Act,
reasoning that the employee's good samaritan gesture was reasonably fore-
seeable, was apparently not prohibited by the employer, and was beneficial
to the company when motorists saw its truck stopped to aid a stranded
family. 85
In 1967, the court again considered the question of an employer's liability
for company-sponsored recreational activities and held compensable the
death of an employee who was involved in an auto accident while on his way
home from a company-sponsored golf outing. In its opinion in Lybrand, Ross
& Montgomery v. Industrial Commission, 8 the court ruled that substantial
employer compulsion to attend such activities, coupled with the employer's
sponsorship and an assumed business purpose was sufficient to bring the case
within the province of the Act. The "substantial" employer compulsion
81. Id. at 157-58, 154 N.E.2d at 235-36.
82. Id.
83. 32 I11. 2d 386, 205 N.E.2d 453 (1965).
84. Id. at 387, 205 N.E.2d at 454.
85. Id. at 388-89, 205 N.E.2d at 455.
86. 36 Ill. 2d 410, 223 N.E.2d 150 (1967).
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referred to by the court proved to be nothing more than the employee's
option to attend the outing or stay at work. 87 If there was any doubt that
the limits on employer liability were ever expanding, such doubt ended in
1978. In Mid-Central Tool Co. v. Industrial Commission, ' 8 the court af-
firmed a Commission award for total and permanent disability arising out of
injuries suffered by an employee who slipped on an icy city sidewalk when he
and his wife were returning home from a company-sponsored Christmas
party. Despite the absence of any evidence or finding of compulsion by the
employer to attend the party, the court found sufficient basis for imposing
liability on the employer merely because the company had planned and paid
for the party which was in part a benefit for the relatively low-paid em-
ployees.8 9  If unproved, intangible benefits of improved esprit de corps
among the employees played any part in the court's opinion, that role, like
the benefits themselves, must be assumed for it was never mentioned. Yet,
the apparent absence of a benefit accruing to the employer did not defeat
liability.
In 1979, further expansion of the limits of employer liability was effected
in Chicago Extruded Metals v. Industrial Commission.9 ° The court af-
firmed the Industrial Commission's award of compensation for injuries sus-
tained by an employee who fell from a stool while attempting to swat a
cockroach climbing on the wall of the company shower room. Although the
duties of the employee did not involve exterminating arthropods or main-
taining the sanitary conditions of the premises, and notwithstanding that
there was absolutely no evidence of employer compulsion, encouragement,
or even acquiescence, the court ignored the purely voluntary assumption of
the unnecessary risk, and concluded without supporting evidence that the
presence of the insect could trigger a feeling of distaste and, if so, the
claimant's reaction was understandable and really in the employer's inter-
est. 91
Two recent decisions may signal the final collapse of any remaining bar-
riers to absolute employer liability. In the first case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Industrial Commission,9 2 the court affirmed an award for death benefits
under such unusual circumstances that one is led to wonder what further
action is needed by the court to make the employer the insurer of his
employee's well-being. The case involved an employee who, over the years
87. Id. at 418-19, 223 N.E.2d at 153-54. The facts of Lybrand appear indistinguishable from
F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 333 Ill. 340, 164 N.E. 668 (1929). The
Lybrand court, however, drew an unconvincing distinction. It argued that Becker involved less
employer control and compulsion to attend, even though the Becker employees were paid to
attend and Lybrand employees were not.
88. 72 I11. 2d 569, 382 N.E.2d 222 (1978).
89. Id. at 577-78, 382 N.E.2d at 226.
90. 77 111. 2d 81, 395 N.E.2d 569 (1979).
91. Id. at 85, 395 N.E.2d at 571.
92. 79 I11. 2d 59, 402 N.E.2d 231 (1980).
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and because of a multitude of personal problems unrelated to his work,
became an alcoholic. When his alcoholism began to affect his work, his
supervisor and close friend advised him to seek help and referred him to an
alcoholic rehabilitation program available under the company's group bene-
fit program. He was warned that should his performance continue to deteri-
orate, he would probably lose his job. After some deliberation, the employee
voluntarily entered the rehabilitation program, but during the course of the
program, he suffered a heart attack. He survived, completed the program,
and returned to work on a limited basis. One Sunday, the claimant suffered
a second heart attack during his sleep and died. 93
The court, after finding that the first attack was caused by the stress of the
alcoholic rehabilitation program and could have contributed to the em-
ployee's death, concluded that the activity was job-related and therefore
compensable. 94 Of course, to arrive at its decision, the court had to ignore
the obvious fact that the risk of injury was the alcoholic condition, a condi-
tion which is purely personal in nature. Nevertheless, the court assumed that
it was in the employer's interest to forestall, minimize, or eliminate the effect
of the employee's alcoholic problem and to increase employee productivity
by making the program available. The court noted that Sears sponsored the
program through its employee benefit package and exercised persuasive
pressures to induce participation. The court, however, was hard pressed to
find that the employee's participation in that program directly or indirectly
carried out the purposes or advanced the interests of the employer.
If Sears left any doubt that the Illinois Supreme Court would apply
virtually any reasoning to find employer liability, such doubt was dispelled
by the court's decision in Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Commis-
sion.95 There, an employee employed as a shelf stacker was injured while he
and other employees of Eagle were playing frisbee in the store's parking lot
during a lunch hour. Although the essential facts were virtually indistin-
guishable from those in Hydro-Line Manufacturing Co.,96 the court issued
an unusual opinion in which it refused to categorize the case as involving
recreational activity. Instead, the court affirmed the award of compensation
based on a combination of theories involving lunch hour and personal com-
fort cases. 97 It is interesting to note, however, the court's following state-
ment in dictum:
93. Id. at 65-69, 402 N.E.2d at 234-36.
94. Id. at 71-73, 402 N.E.2d at 237-38.
95. 82 I11. 2d 331, 412 N.E.2d 492 (1980).
96. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra. Both cases involved lunch hour recreational
activities that the company neither benefitted from nor sponsored, and arguably, Hydro-Line
Manufacturing presented a stronger case for liability because the company had at least consid-
ered sponsorship.
97. 82 11. 2d at 338-39, 412 N.E.2d at 496-97. The Eagle Discount court summarized the
lunch hour decisions as deciding that eating lunch is a reasonable incident of employment such
that the course of employment is continuous. Id. Similarly, the course of employment remains
intact when employees act to meet personal comfort needs, provided those needs arise from
employment conditions. Id. Yet, the Eagle Discount decision eliminated that proviso.
[Vol. 30:347
A SYSTEM IN NEED
If we were to categorize this case as such [recreational activity], we
would be compelled to find sufficient employer sponsorship to
render the activity incidental to the employment; that is, the recre-
ational activity was an accepted, regular and normal one which
occurred on the premises during an authorized lunch break.98
This statement indicates the court's apparent misunderstanding of its own
decisions in the athletic activity cases. Not only does it ignore the personal
nature of the risk, but it never mentions the oft-stated requirements of
employer financing, presumed benefit to the employer, and employer com-
pulsion to participate, the very requirements that the court found essential in
prior cases.99
To summarize, since 1955 the Illinois Supreme Court and the Industrial
Commission have repeatedly resolved compensation questions by focusing on
whether an employee's activities resulting in injury benefited his or her
employer, rather than whether those activities involved any risks required by
or peculiar to the employment. By reviving the previously rejected employer-
benefit standard, the court and Commission have silently overruled tradi-
tional compensability definitions that formerly served as restrictions on em-
ployer liability. To add insult to injury, recent applications of the
employer-benefit analysis have allowed recovery for employees whose dis-
abilities or deaths were caused by purely personal, non-business activities,
such as consuming alcoholic beverages or playing frisbee during lunchtime.
Cases like these, where the employer's benefit is so speculative and remote,
raise serious doubts as to whether any meaningful limitations on employer
liability now exist in Illinois.
WHERE TO FROM HRE?
While the foregoing is by no means a comprehensive, entirely impartial
history of workers' compensation in Illinois, the particular selection of fac-
tual situations, cases, and historical developments illustrate an administra-
tive and judicial attitude that has contributed to what many consider a
workers' compensation crisis in Illinois. That the system has developed far
beyond the parameters of its original intent and purpose is obvious. It can no
longer be said that the major portion of compensation dollars spent by
employers is related, in any way, to an employee's present or prospective loss
in earning capacity. In fact, almost seventy-five percent of compensation
dollars are spent on indemnity for injuries, many of which bear no relation-
ship at all to a present or prospective loss of earning capacity. 0 0
98. 82 111. 2d at 338, 412 N.E.2d at 496.
99. Yet unclear is the precedential effect of this case in light of the recent amendment to the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Act which excludes voluntary recreational activities from cover-
age. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.11 (Supp. 1980).
100. See Illinois Workers' Compensation: The Caterpillar Perspective (Ju.-e, 1980) (unpub-
lished white paper available from Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois).
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Furthermore, the commissioners and the courts, with the tacit approval of
the legislature, have expanded the concept of employer liability far beyond
that reasonably necessary to accomplish even the most liberal purposes of the
Act. The conclusion compelled by the more recent decisions of our court is
that the system has been converted into one under which the employer is the
guarantor of the employee's well-being. The fact is that these decisions have
drastically strained the scope and intent of the Act so as to create from
workers' compensation a system more akin to general social insurance.
This Article in no way suggests a return to the common law as a proper
method of redressing employee injuries or determining employer liability.
That lesson was learned all too painfully in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Redirection of the workers' compensation system is necessary,
nonetheless, if all parties are to expect the system to function in a balanced
manner. There is no easy solution. No solution will prove worthwhile,
however, without cognizance of the historical basis and development of
workers' compensation. That perspective suggests several directions in which
any reasonable solution might proceed.
The efforts of the Commission, the Illinois courts, and the legislature must
be redirected to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the worker's compen-
sation system. It must be remembered that the system was designed with the
intent to protect a worker and his dependents against loss of earning capac-
ity, present or prospective, resulting from risks reasonably incurred in the
performance of the workers duties and that such risks must occur at a time
and place, and under circumstances reasonably required by the employ-
ment. With this purpose in mind, attention must be focused upon the fact
that the system was never intended to allow recovery of monetary damages
for injuries sustained, but which have no relationship to earning capacity.
Likewise, the system was never intended to provide recovery for injuries
resulting from risks which the employee need not reasonably assume to do his
job, but which in some way may be directly or indirectly related to the
employer-employee relationship. The foreseeability of the injury and as-
sumed employer benefit should no more be a basis for employer liability than
unforeseeability or conduct inuring to the detriment of the employer are
defenses. Rather, the statutory concepts of "arising out of" and "in the course
of" must be reinstated as the sole basis for determining an employer's liability
under the Act.
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